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RESUMo: o Brasil foi um dos países emergentes que enfrentou fortes pressões de 
apreciação cambial entre o 2º trimestre de 2009 e julho de 2011. é sob este contexto que 
pode ser entendida a aplicação da Regulação da Conta Capital (CAR) depois de 2009, que 
foi complementada com outro tipo de regulação, a Regulação dos Derivativos Cambiais 
(FXDR). Este trabalho mostra que, somente quando o governo brasileiro adotou estes dois 
tipos de regulação simultaneamente, houve um aumento da eficácia das políticas em deter 
essas pressões. A experiência brasileira também revela que não é possível estabelecer uma 
hierarquia entre os instrumentos temporários para gerenciar fluxos de capital e medidas 
prudenciais permanentes, tal como defende a abordagem atual do FMI.
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brasileira.
ABSTRACT: Brazil was one of the emerging countries that had a stronger trend of currency 
appreciation from the 2nd quarter of 2009 to July 2011. Under this context that can be 
understood the implementation of capital account regulation (CAR) after 2009, which was 
complemented with another kind of regulation, the so-called FX Derivatives Regulation 
(FXDR). This paper shows that only when Brazilian government adopted these two kinds 
of regulations simultaneously, the policy effectiveness increased in terms of protecting the 
Brazilian currency from upward pressures. Brazilian experience also highlights that it is not 
possible to establish a hierarchy between temporary instruments to manage capital flows 
and permanent prudential measures, as supported by the IMF current approach.
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INTRoDUCTIoN
A new wave of capital flows to emerging economies, boosted by the post-cri-
sis circumstances (quantitative easing policies and historical low interest rates in 
advanced countries, etc.), took place from the 2nd quarter of 2009 to the first 
quarter of 2013. In May 2013, when the Federal Reserve (Fed) merely indicated 
that it might begin tapering this policy toward the end of the calendar year, global 
investors set into motion a portfolio adjustment that caused a temporary but sig-
nificant reversal in capital flows to U.S., putting upward pressures on the exchange 
rates of many emerging economies (BIS, 2014). 
During the boom phase of the recent cycle, once more, “emerging-market as-
sets” became objects of desire on the part of global investors, resuming policy di-
lemmas to emerging countries stemming from the combination of high growth 
rates, accelerating inflation (associated with the post-crisis commodity prices 
boom), excessive currency appreciation and/or asset price overshooting. 
In order to deal with these policy dilemmas, some of these countries resorted 
to capital account regulation (CAR), which encompasses capital controls and fi-
nancial prudential regulation (Gallagher et al, 2012). This regulation aimed at 
halting the trend of currency appreciation and of speculative bubbles in asset pric-
es as well as at reducing the risks of rising current account deficits and the costs of 
excessive Foreign Exchange (FX) reserve accumulation. Thus, unlike the pre-crisis 
context, most of these countries did not adopt a hands-off approach to capital 
inflows. 
Brazil was one of the emerging countries that had a stronger trend of currency 
appreciation until July 2011 due to the combination of huge capital inflows, in-
creasing commodity prices, high domestic interest rate, and a sophisticated and 
deep FX derivatives market completely open to foreign investors that provides 
room for speculation on the exchange rate through operations with FX derivatives 
(the so-called derivatives carry-trade). Under this context that can be understood 
the recent implementation of the CAR, which was complemented with another 
kind of regulation, called here FX Derivatives Regulation (FXDR), whose target is 
FX derivatives operations of all agents, being them financial and non-financial as 
well as non-residents and residents.
As the experience of implementation of capital account regulation (CAR) in 
2009-2013 in Brazil is still recent there are few empirical works that assessed its 
effectiveness. Using a GARCh regression, Baumann and Gallagher (2012) found 
that the introduction of CAR in Brazil between october 2009 and December 2012 
had a small but significant impact on shifting the composition of capital inflows 
toward longer-term investment, on curbing the level and volatility of exchange 
rate, and on modestly increasing Brazilian monetary policy autonomy. Another 
empirical study (Chamon and Garcia, 2016) analyzed the impact of the capital 
controls adopted in Brazil from late 2009 until 2012, and concluded that while 
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the first several measures (until mid-2011) had very limited success in containing 
the currency appreciation, the Brazilian exchange rate seems to respond strongly 
just after the adoption of a financial tax on the notional amount of derivatives. on 
the other hand, Klein (2012), by analyzing the pattern of controls on capital in-
flows in a set of 44 advanced and emerging economies (including Brazil), con-
cluded that the Brazilian tax on financial operations (IoF) was an episodic control 
on the capital inflows that did not temper the appreciation of the Brazilian cur-
rency; however, the period covered in his study ended in 2010, therefore before the 
adoption of a broader FXDR. 
Differently from these empirical assessments based on econometric methods, 
this paper applies qualitative methods and descriptive statistics to analyze the 
measures of CAR and FXDR implemented in Brazil over 2009-2013. This ap-
proach was chosen due to the overlap and interdependency of factors affecting the 
Brazilian exchange rate path in this period: i) external shocks with high frequency, 
given the unstable global environment and the even high volatility of international 
capital flows after the global financial crisis; ii) macroeconomic policy shifts, espe-
cially in monetary and foreign exchange policies; iii) frequent changes in regula-
tion at the domestic level. 
 In line with the empirical findings of Baumann and Gallagher (2012) and 
Chamon and Garcia (2016), our assessment suggest that the regulations adopted 
in Brazil in the aforementioned period were effective in affecting the exchange rate 
path, yet only when the three kinds of measures (capital controls, prudential finan-
cial regulation and FXDR) were simultaneously in place the policy effectiveness 
increased in terms of protecting the Brazilian currency from upward pressures. 
Therefore, our main contribution is to show that there are important feedbacks 
between capital controls, prudential financial regulation and FXDR, as much as 
between these measures and macroeconomic policy, so that it is not possible to 
establish a hierarchy between instruments to manage capital flows and curb their 
undesirable outcomes (such as currency appreciation and financial fragility) as 
supported by the current IMF approach.
The arguments are organized in four sections, besides this introduction. 
Second section focuses on international financial integration, capital flows and 
CAR in emerging economies, including a brief discussion on the new institutional 
view of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on capital controls. Third section 
provides a brief overview of capital flows and capital account liberalization in 
Brazil. Fourth section details the specificity of the Brazilian experience and the key 
features of CAR and FXDR after the global financial crisis. Some lessons from the 
Brazilian experience are presented in the final section.
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INTERNATIoNAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATIoN, CAPITAL FLoWS AND 
CAPITAL ACCoUNT REGULATIoN IN EMERGING ECoNoMIES
International financial integration, economic performance and macroeconomic 
instability
Prasad et al. (2003) sum up the conventional view that gives support to inter-
national financial integration, pointing out that the potential benefits of financial 
liberalization for emerging market countries can be divided in two channels: direct 
and indirect. Direct channels include augmentation of domestic savings2, reduc-
tion in the cost of capital due to better global allocation of risk, reduction of con-
sumption volatility, transfer of technological and managerial know-how, and stim-
ulation of domestic financial sector development. Indirect channels include 
promotion of specialization, commitment to better economic policies, and signal-
ing the practice of more friendly policies. Therefore, according to this view finan-
cial liberalization results in market discipline that shall stimulate more consistent 
macroeconomic policy (understood as sound fiscal and monetary policies, etc.) as 
market force (“rational foreign investors”) can penalize bad policies. 
A lot of empirical works, most of them using panel data and measuring the 
international financial integration with the use of different de jure and de facto 
indexes, seek to evaluate the relationship between capital account liberalization, 
on one hand, and economic growth, financial crises and/or macroeconomic vola-
tility, on the other hand. Some surveys conclude that empirical evidences in gen-
eral do not present a robust relationship between financial liberalization and eco-
nomic growth (Prasad et al., 2003; Einchengreen, 2004, Ch 3). 
Some IMF’s economists works have acknowledged the potential risks and 
costs related to international financial integration and specifically to the volatility 
of capital flows in emerging economies (Prasad et al., 2003; Kose et al., 2006; IMF, 
2008), as the surge of capital inflows can have negative effects on emerging econo-
mies, including the appreciation of the domestic currency beyond the equilibrium 
level, fiscal costs of sterilization related to international reserves accumulation, in-
flationary pressures can result from incomplete sterilization and/or credit boom, 
and possible bubbles in certain sectors as equity markets. however, IMF (2008) 
sustains that financial globalization leads to better macroeconomic outcomes when 
certain threshold conditions of financial and institutional developments are met 
(financial market development, institutional quality, sound macroeconomic policies, 
trade integration), but some analysts have argued that such conditions are almost 
the same factors pointed out as collateral benefits of financial globalization, gener-
ating a logical contradiction between consequences and causes (Biancareli, 2008). 
yet, since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, some prominent main-
stream economists have stressed that with the financial liberalization and the 
2 This augmentation is related to the notion that capital flows from capital-rich countries to the capital-
poor countries due to a comparatively higher marginal productivity capital in the former ones.
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emergence and spread of new financial instruments (such as derivatives), the likeli-
hood of occurrence of speculative financial operations increases substantially. 
Tobin (1978) was one of the first economists to state that the main macroeco-
nomic problem related to integrated financial markets is not the choice of the ap-
propriate exchange rate regime but the excessive short-run capital mobility that 
reduces the autonomy of national governments to pursue domestic objectives with 
respect to employment, output and inflation. Stepping forward Stiglitz (2000) 
points out that capital flows to emerging countries are markedly pro-cyclical and 
exacerbate economic booms, and that financial liberalization exposes countries to 
the vicissitudes associated with changes in economic circumstances outside the 
country; so that such economies are exposed to sudden change in lenders’ and in-
vestors’ perceptions. 
As the Post Keynesian literature (Schulmeister, 1988; harvey, 2009) highlight-
ed, in this setting, featured by floating exchange rates and free capital mobility, 
short-term capital flows constitute the chief determinant of nominal exchange 
rates, which are highly volatile. In this perspective, the speculative feature of these 
flows, subordinate to financial investors’ risk aversion/appetite, is the main cause 
of the volatility of exchange rates. however, exchange rate volatility in general is 
higher in emerging economies than in developed ones due to the monetary asym-
metry of the international monetary and financial system that refers to the hierar-
chical dimension of the international monetary system. In other words, national 
currencies are hierarchically positioned according to their degree of liquidity, 
which relates to their ability to perform internationally the three functions of mon-
ey: medium of exchange, unit of account and denomination of contracts, and store 
of value (international reserve currency). The key currency (currently, the fiduciary 
US dollar) is placed at the top of the hierarchy because it has the highest degree of 
liquidity. The currencies issued by the other core countries are in intermediate po-
sition, as they have a high liquidity premium, but not as high as the dollar. At the 
opposite end are the currencies issued by the emerging economies, which are non-
liquid currencies, for they are incapable of performing those functions. 
Consequently, these currencies, priced with a lower liquidity premium, are espe-
cially vulnerable to the inherent volatility of capital flows in the post-Bretton 
Woods system. The smaller and less liquid foreign exchange and financial markets 
of emerging economies make them more vulnerable to one-way expectations and 
herd behavior (Andrade and Prates, 2013). 
Policy space and capital account regulation
In order to enhance the possibility of a successful management of exchange 
rate regime in emerging economies some measures to reduce the volatility of cap-
ital flows and the likelihood of speculation attack against the domestic currency 
can be necessary. one possibility is the use of official intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, which may exert direct influence on nominal exchange rate as 
it alters the relative supply of domestic and foreign currencies. on the one hand, 
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the countries’ ability to resist currency depreciation is limited by its stock of for-
eign exchange reserves and its access to potential credit lines. Thus, reserve accu-
mulation can be seen as an insurance against future negative shocks and specula-
tion against the domestic currency, as emerging economies have limited access to 
the international capital market during times of high risk aversion of foreign in-
vestors. on the other hand, the ability to avoid currency appreciation may require 
the use of sterilized intervention. Monetary authorities have often sought to ster-
ilize the impact of foreign exchange intervention through open market operations 
and other measures, such as increasing bank reserve requirements. Moreover, 
sterilization often implies quasi-fiscal costs, as it in general involves the central 
bank exchanging high-yield domestic assets for low-yield foreign reserves 
(Cardarelli et al., 2009).
Another possibility to enhance the management of the exchange rate regime 
(that is not excluding official intervention in the currency markets) in emerging 
economies is the use of ‘capital account regulation’ (CAR) (Gallagher et al., 2012) 
or ‘capital management techniques’ which include capital controls, that is mea-
sures that manage volume, composition, and/or allocation of international private 
capital flows, and/or ‘prudential domestic financial regulations’, which refer to 
policies, such as capital-adequacy standards, reporting requirements, or restric-
tions on the ability and terms under which domestic financial institutions can 
provide to certain types of projects (Epstein et al., 2003: p.6-7). Capital controls 
can be used for different though related objectives, such as: (i) to reduce the vul-
nerability of a country to financial crises, including capital flight during currency 
crisis; (ii) to drive a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates in order to 
provide monetary authorities with some policy autonomy at least in the short-run; 
and (iii) to maintain some short-term stability of nominal exchange rate and to 
reduce exchange rate pressures derived from excessive capital inflows. 
Regarding the effectiveness of CAR, Magud and Reinhart (2006) review more 
than 30 papers that evaluated capital controls either on inflows or outflows 
around the world, making use of a capital controls effectiveness index in order to 
standardize the results of the empirical studies. They conclude that “capital con-
trols on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent; alter the com-
position of capital flow; reduce real exchange rate pressures (although the evi-
dence is more controversial)”, but “seem not to reduce the volume of net flows 
(and hence, the current account balance)”, while “limiting private external bor-
rowing in the ‘good times’ plays an important prudential role because more often 
than not countries that are ‘debt intolerant’” (Magud and Reinhart, 2006: 26-27). 
Finally, Magud and Reinhart (2006) argue that enhancing the effectiveness of cap-
ital controls is necessary to take into account country-specific characteristics in 
their design. 
Concerned with the amount and volatility of capital flows to emerging econo-
mies after the contagious of the 2008 crisis, IMF revised its official position re-
garding the evaluation of capital controls (IMF, 2010, 2011, 2012b; ostry et al. 
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2010, 2011). This finally resulted in a new institutional view endorsed by the IMF 
(IMF, 2012), especially with regards to the regulation of capital inflows.
In fact, the IMF in its definitive policy framework (IMF 2012) has made rel-
evant progress compared not only to its traditional rejection of capital controls 
but also in comparison to its preliminary approaches of 2010 and 2011 to tolerate 
capital controls under highly specific circumstances (ostry et al. 2010 to IMF, 
2011). By introducing the new term “capital flow management measures” (CFMs), 
IMF gives more policy space to emerging economies subject to major capital in-
flow surges inasmuch it loosened the clear-cut hierarchy between instruments to 
manage capital flows which cover the whole range of macroeconomic policies, 
prudential regulations and capital controls (defined in a jurisdictional manner). 
yet, at the same time, this new policy framework contains two main short-
comings. First, by defining CFMs as a temporary instrument embedded in an over-
all strategy of financial opening, the organization insists on the general advantages 
of financial liberalization, which set serious limits to developing and emerging 
economies’ policy space. Second, the Fund keeps defending the separation of a 
permanent prudential financial regulation (referred to as MPMs) and only tempo-
rary CFMs. In our view, this discrimination is not feasible especially in emerging 
and developing economies inasmuch their currencies are characterized by a limit-
ed acceptance at the international level which increases the potential harmful ef-
fects of international capital flows in terms of financial fragility and macroeco-
nomic management.3 
CAPITAL FLoWS AND CAPITAL ACCoUNT  
LIBERALIzATIoN IN BRAzIL: A BRIEF oVERVIEW
Capital account liberalization in Brazil began in the 1990s and was most time 
incremental, marked by key rules that, given their strong impact on capital inflows 
and outflows, can be considered as landmarks. This was the case with the ap-
proval, in 1991, of Annex IV of Central Bank of Brazil Resolution no. 1,289, per-
mitting foreign institutional investors to participate directly in the Brazilian capi-
tal market and, in 1992, the redesign of CC5 accounts, permitting residents and 
non-residents to make capital transfers abroad from Brazil. So, both capital in-
flows and capital outflows were liberalized in Brazil. The process of financial 
opening gained momentum in January 2000, when the Resolution CMN no. 2,689 
allowed the unrestricted access of non-resident (i.e. foreign) investors to all the 
segments of the domestic financial market, including the derivatives market. 
Afterwards, during the 2000s there was in course a process of consolidation of the 
foreign exchange rules (Paula, 2011). 
3 For a more details on the new IMF institutional view on capital controls, see Gallagher (2012) and 
Fritz and Prates (2014).
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Domestic norms on foreign exchange transactions allow the implementa-
tion of capital controls at any time – there is no formal restriction on this con-
cern. Law 4,321/1961, which allows the adoption of controls on capital out-
flows by foreign investors and transnational enterprises, has not been repealed. 
however, there are some limits to the efficacy of CCR due to two specificities of 
the Brazilian economy. 
The first one is the high degree of financial openness of the Brazilian econo-
my. The country had a broad and deep experience of external financial liberal-
ization. Although Brazil adopted a more gradual style of Washington Consensus 
policies compared other Latin American countries, capital account liberalization 
was relatively fast and widespread. The second specificity is the huge differential 
between internal and external interest rates, which attracted dramatically capital 
inflows, mainly portfolio ones, and stimulated private agents to find loopholes 
to circumvent the regulations (regulatory arbitrage), as detailed in the next sec-
tion. Despite the reduction of the policy rate (Selic) by the BCB from August 
2011 to February 2012, the differential between the internal and external inter-
est rates has been still high compared to other emerging countries (see Figure 1). 
Since middle of 2013, when BCB began to increase the Selic rate seeking to re-
duce the inflation rate, interest rate differential increased dramatically from 
5.9% to 7.8% in December 2013.
Figure 1: Interest rate differential (%), 2010-2013
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As we can see in the Figure 2, a new surge of capital inflows to Latin America – 
except to Argentina and Venezuela - started in the middle of 2009, with a quick re-
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covery of capital inflows after the contagious of the global financial crisis4. The main 
drivers behind of this wave to emerging economies were: (i) loosening monetary 
policy in advanced economies due to the “quantitative easing” policy of the FED, and 
later of the ECB, widening the interest rate differentials and creating abundant glob-
al market liquidity; (ii) better economic performance of the emerging economies and 
the slow recovery of the developed countries; (iii) sound fiscal and debt position of 
the emerging economies relative to advance economies; and (iv) and particularly im-
portant to Latin American countries, quick and continuous recovered of commodity 
prices until May 2011, when prices started a decline trend. This new surge of capital 
inflows, however, has lost momentum (though, not sharply) and become more vola-
tile since 2013. As we have already mentioned, in May 2013 Fed announced a gra-
dual reduction in the monetary stimulus which resulted in a greater turbulence in the 
world financial market, with particular impact on emerging economies. 
Figure 2: Financial account net balance (USD million), 1994-01/2014-01
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All these factors, along with improved global risk appetite, attracted capital 
inflows, especially portfolio debt capital flows. The episode of capital inflows after 
the Lehman Brother’s contagion was characterized by a predominance of volatile 
portfolio inflows, much more than previous wave, with a sharp and unprecedent-
ed increase in the flows (net flows of more than USD 50 billion in some quarters), 
followed by the direct investments th t hav  increased in 2011. Note that Brazil 
4 For an analysis of the causes and consequences of the capital inflows boom to Latin America in 2009-
2011, see Paula  (2013).
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had records of capital flows in the recent wave, followed far above by Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru and Chile. This movement can be attributed to the improvement 
in the country-risk (Brazil got the degree of “investment grade” in the second 
quarter of 2008) and the interest rate huge differentials.
Figure 3 shows the BCB interventions in the foreign exchange market (spot 
market) since 1999, when Brazil adopted a floating exchange rate regime, where 
negative values means that it is selling foreign currencies and positive values means 
that it is buying them. A general outlook shows broadly speaking two distinguish 
BCB pattern of intervention: (i) from 1999 to September 2005 exchange rate pol-
icy was of “free float” type, in which BCB did only eventual and few interventions, 
mainly in periods of instability in the foreign exchange market (such as during the 
2002 confidence crisis), selling dollars in order to avoid further devaluation of the 
domestic currency; (ii) since october 2005 BCB began to buy foreign currencies in 
a continuous but uneven way, mainly as part of the international reserves accumu-
lation policy, without having any commitment with a certain level of exchange 
rate, that continued to have an appreciation trend. Some more aggressive interven-
tion was done eventually in order to reduce greater exchange rate volatility in the 
sense of appreciation or depreciation. So, there was a more typical dirty floating 
behavior. In the end of August 2013, however, BCB launched a program of selling 
US$ 2 billion of FX swaps weekly, besides loans of US$ 1 billion to the banks in 
the spot market every week, to smoothen the capital flight due to the announce-
ment of the ‘tapering’ by Fed. As a result of such policy, BCB sold USD in the sec-
ond semester of 2013 (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: BCB intervention in the foreign exchange market (US$ billion), 1994 –2013
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Since the 1990s, CCR have been mainly endogenous in Brazil, in the sense 
that they have been adopted and tightened during periods of boom of capital 
flows, and have been loosened during periods of capital flight (Cardoso and 
Goldfajn, 1998; Paula, 2011). The exception occurred during Lula da Silva’s 
government when the Brazilian economy faced a capital flows boom in 2005-
2008 without adopting CCR (instead BCB accumulated FX reserves with very 
high fiscal costs). During the 2000s financial liberalization was integral part of 
the ‘model’ of economic policy inspired in the New Consensus on 
Macroeconomics (floating exchange regime, inflation target regime and primary 
fiscal surplus). Likely the only important change was the policy of foreign ex-
change reserves accumulation that aimed at having a cushion of safety against 
currency speculation and reducing exchange rate volatility. It is worth to men-
tion that Brazil compared to other major Latin American economies did a more 
aggressive FX reserve accumulation policy (see Figure 4), that however did not 
avoid the general trend for exchange rate appreciation. This trend was somehow 
tolerated by BCB as essential to the attainment of the inflation target in Brazil 
(Arestis et al., 2010).
Figure 4: Foreign exchange reserves (US$ billion), 2000-2013
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Indeed, intervention in the currency markets, including accumulation of FX 
reserves, has been massive in Argentina, Brazil and Chile and very high in 
Colombia and Peru (Figure 4). however, for some economies there was a gradual 
trend of real appreciation of the domestic currencies due to massive capital in-
flows. This was the case of Brazil and Colombia that, together with Venezuela, 
are the countries whose currencies had a strong upward pressure in real terms, 
which means a downward trend of the real effective exchange rate (as the ex-
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  37 (1), 2017 • pp. 108-128
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change rate is the price of the USD) (Figure 5). Brazil was one of the emerging 
countries that had a stronger trend of currency appreciation until February 2012. 
In 2012-2013 there was some trend of currency depreciation in the major Latin 
American economies.
Figure 5: Real Effective Exchange Rate, 2002-2013 (2005 = 100)
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In the post-global financial crisis context, CAR was also predominantly endog-
enous in Brazil. After implementing some slight capital controls in 2009 and 2010, it 
was only after January 2011 (when the first prudential financial regulation tool was 
implemented) and, mainly, after July 2011 (when the Brazilian government adopted 
a broader regulation of the FX derivatives operations) a more comprehensive regu-
lation has been launched, encompassing both CAR (capital controls and prudential 
financial regulation) and FX derivatives market regulation (FXDR). This new regu-
latory approach was an integral part of a broader change in the conduction of eco-
nomic policy during the first Dilma Roussef’s government (2011-2014). on the one 
hand, BCB adopted a more flexible monetary policy with the use of broader tools of 
monetary policy, including macro-prudential measures, and since August 2011 be-
gan a gradual and continuous reduction in the interest rates (from 12.5% in August 
2011 to 8.5% in June 2012) so adopting a more “forward looking” behavior. The 
BCB policy changed by mid-2013, when the policy rate (Selic) target began to in-
crease again in order to face inflationary pressures. 
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With the adoption of CAR and FXDR over 2010-2012, the Brazilian govern-
ment increased its policy space and was able to manage the level of the exchange 
rate, curbing the currency appreciation trend caused by huge capital flows and 
derivatives carry trade, as we will analyze in the next section. 
CAPITAL ACCoUNT REGULATIoN AND FX DERIVATIVES REGULATIoN
Before detailing CAR and FXDR in Brazil after the global financial crisis, it 
is worth to clarify that this last type of regulation is key in Brazil due to the speci-
ficities of the FX derivatives market in Brazil which gave rise to a central role of 
this market in the trend of the country´s exchange rate (BRL)5 . This central role 
stems from the much higher liquidity and depth of the FX futures market, in com-
parison with the FX spot market. The predominance of the organized segment in 
the FX derivatives markets (i.e., futures traded in BM&F Bovespa) is a specificity 
of Brazil´s currency market. According to Avdjiev et al. (2010), the BRL was the 
second most traded currency worldwide in the organized derivatives markets in 
2010.
A major distinction of the Brazilian FX derivatives (futures and oTC) market 
is that these operations are non-deliverable. This means that gains or losses in 
these operations are liquidated in domestic (BRL – Brazilian real), and not in for-
eign currency (USD). Due to their non-deliverable legislation, the margin require-
ments of FX futures transactions can be fulfilled in BRL. Along with the unre-
stricted access of non-residents to the FX futures market in the context of financial 
liberalization, this specific norm has contributed to its higher liquidity in compari-
son with the FX spot market as FX futures operations can be carried out without 
any effective foreign currency flows. 
Both before (2003 to mid-2008) and after (since 2009) the global financial 
crisis, during periods of low risk aversion, foreign institutional investors have 
become the most important investor group in the FX Futures market, fostering a 
real appreciation trend through derivative carry trade. This is a different kind of 
currency speculation strategy, compared to the canonical carry trade through 
spot market operations - when an investor borrows money in a currency with a 
low interest rate and uses it to take long positions in currencies backed by high 
interest rate (Gagnon and Chaboud, 2007). This strategy presents advantages 
because of their inherent high degree of leverage (as in order to be carried out, 
financial derivatives operations require only the payment of a margin require-
ment).
In derivatives markets carry trade expresses itself as a bet which results in a 
short position in the funding currency and a long position in the target currency 
5 Predominantly an appreciation trend, i.e., a fall of the BRL/USD exchange rate which is the price of 
USD
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(Idem, 2007). In the case of Brazil, due to the huge differential between the inter-
nal and external interest rates, since 2003 foreign investors have taken, predomi-
nantly, one way bets on the Brazilian currency appreciation through short posi-
tions in the FX futures market (selling USD dollars and buying BRL), which has 
resulted in downward pressure on the USD price and, thus, in upward pressure on 
the BRL price. 
FX future and spot markets are linked by the arbitrage carried out mainly by 
banks as the dealers in the FX spot market. In front of the downward trend of the 
USD futures price, these agents took the contrary position of foreign investors in 
the FX futures market (long position in USD and short in BRL). With this strategy, 
banks have earned arbitrage profits and, at the same time, caused additional ap-
preciation of the Brazilian currency. 
The derivatives carry trade turns out to be even more attractive in Brazil due 
to the non-deliverable feature of the FX futures market. In the case of Brazil, until 
october 2010, foreign and domestic agents could engage in derivatives carry trade 
not even investing on the margin, as usual with derivatives operations, but without 
disbursing one USD. More than that, this carry trade strategy could also be per-
formed without the expenditure of one single BRL because investors could meet 
their margin requirements in BRL via domestic borrowed securities or guarantees 
from local banks. Despite the leadership of foreign investors, profit-seeking do-
mestic agents, such as institutional investors and companies, have also engaged in 
derivatives carry trade (Fritz and Prates, 2014).
Therefore, while other countries only face a problem of low efficacy of capital 
controls to deal with FX derivatives operations (due to its high degree of leverage), 
Brazilian authorities were dealing with an even greater challenge, as these opera-
tions could simulate the impact of capital flows on the exchange rate without any 
effective foreign currency flows. Consequently, capital controls, which focus only 
on foreign capital flows, have proven to be ineffective in restraining them. At the 
same time, prudential financial regulation was also insufficient as it reaches only 
financial institutions. Therefore, the two kind of CAR do not reach operations car-
ried out by non-resident investors and non-financial resident agents in the FX fu-
ture market6. 
The Brazilian regulatory authorities after some time realized this constraint. 
Since october 2010, they have launched, along with CAR, specific measures to tap 
FX derivatives operations, the already mentioned “FX Derivatives Regulation” 
(FXDR). This new kind of regulation has revealed to be key in restraining the BRL 
appreciation trend and, in turn, mitigating the economic policy dilemma faced by 
the Brazilian government, mainly, containing inflationary pressures without rein-
forcing the exchange rate misalignment (Figure 6).
6 For a detailed explanation of the differences among the three kinds of regulations, see Prates (2014). 
Revista de Economia Política  37 (1), 2017 • pp. 108-128
122
Figure 6: BRL/USD exchange rate, Jan.2009-December 2013
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In october 2010, a price-based capital control (a financial tax on inflows, 
called Imposto de operações Financeiras, IoF), already adopted at a low level in 
2009, was increased to curb the undesirable effects on financial and macroeco-
nomic stability of one important kind of capital flows outside the scope of pruden-
tial financial regulation: portfolio investment in equity and fixed income. Brazilian 
government a few days later also closed a loophole that allowed foreign investors 
to avoid the higher tax on fixed income investments established before. Moreover, 
the first FXDR was implemented: the IoF on margin requirements on FX deriva-
tives transactions was increased from 0.38 per cent to 6 per cent and some loop-
holes for IoF on margin requirements were closed (Table 1, in annex). 
however, the first rounds of CAR and FXDR showed to be insufficient, as the 
IoF was too low to stem the derivatives carry trade due to its high leverage degree. 
Moreover, private agents found loopholes to circumvent the regulations (Figure 1). 
one of the main channels of circumvention after october 2010 was the increase in 
bank´s short dollar positions in the spot currency market. In fact, the IoF on port-
folio inflows encouraged the build-up of long real/short dollar positions in the 
on-shore derivatives market, that is, the derivatives carry trade supported by resi-
dent banks. 
To close this loophole, the Central Bank of Brazil adopted a non-interest re-
serve requirement on these positions in January 2011, which is a prudential finan-
cial regulation tool. Nevertheless, banks found another channel of regulatory arbi-
trage by switching to short term foreign borrowings which also allow them to 
obtain arbitrage gains between the internal and external interest rates. The regula-
tory response was the IoF on this kind of capital flows adopted in March 2011. 
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however, private agents were able to make longer term loans giving the excess of 
liquidity and searching for yield in the international financial market. Then, in 
April the government extended the IoF to these loans. Consequently, until the first 
semester of 2011, the impact of the CAR was mainly on the composition of in-
flows rather than on their volume.
Concerning the currency appreciation trend, this could be curbed only after 
the launch of a broader FXDR in the end of July 2011. At that time, the govern-
ment imposed a financial tax of 1 per cent on excessive long positions on BRL in 
the FX derivatives market. These measures at least had a longer lasting effect as 
they reach not only the marginal requirements, but the notional value of the carry 
trade operations at the FX derivatives market. The exchange rate BRL/US$ in-
creased from 1.70 in 02/28/2012 to 2.00 in 18/05/2012, a nominal devaluation of 
17.6% (Figure 1). 
An additional reason for such exchange rate behavior is some reduction in the 
net capital flows to Brazil since mid-2011 due to both the BCB policy determina-
tion to reduce short-term interest rate and the increase of risk aversion of foreign 
investors due to the higher likelihood of the imminence of a euro crisis. Therefore, 
besides shaping the composition of capital flows, the CAR launched by Brazil be-
gan to affect the size of flows in the new internal and external setting. This new 
setting, in turn, has allowed the loosening of capital controls since December 2012 
(Table 1). 
yet, in the second quarter of 2013, it turned out that the effectiveness of CAR 
on capital inflows and FXDR on investors´ long positions in FX derivatives de-
pended on the phase of the capital flows cycle; in other words, this effectiveness 
was highly asymmetric in its boom and bust phases. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in May 2013, when Fed indicated that it 
might begin tapering its quantitative easing policy toward the end of the calendar 
year, global investors launched a portfolio adjustment that caused a temporary but 
significant reversal in capital flows to the US, putting upward pressures on the 
exchange rates of many emerging economies (BIS, 2014), the most vulnerable to 
global investor due to the monetary asymmetries of the international monetary 
system (see section 2.1). 
The BRL was one of the most affected, mainly due to the higher liquidity and 
deepness of the Brazilian currency and financial markets and the huge net short 
positions of foreign investors in the FX future market – which bet on the BRL ap-
preciation in that moment (Prates, 2014). In order to mitigate the currency depre-
ciation, the government withdrew in June and July virtually all CAR and FXDR. 
only the IoF for new and renewed foreign loans with maturities of up to 1 year 
remained in force (Table 1).
Then, in face of the cycle downturn, the regulations were counter-cyclically 
removed. however, the quick response of Brazilian policy makers was insufficient 
to curb the currency depreciation. In a setting of flight to quality (i.e, to U.S 
Treasury bonds) and high risk aversion, the removal of the broader regulatory 
framework which only penalizes bets in favor of the BRL was almost harmless to 
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stem the currency depreciation. Its only impact was on the foreign portfolio in-
vestment in the public bonds market, which were stimulated by the greater returns 
after the IoF withdrew and the policy rate rise since March 2013 (Prates, 2014). 
however, theses inflows were insufficient to stop the currency depreciation 
due to the very dynamic of the Brazilian currency market. As during the boom, in 
the bust phase changes in investors’ positions in the FX derivatives market were 
the main determinant of the BRL trend. Indeed, the withdrawal of the IoF on long 
positions made easier the portfolio adjustment to short positions, which means 
bets on the BRL depreciation. In this setting, only a financial tax on excessive 
short positions (i.e, a FX derivatives regulation which penalize bets on the BRL 
depreciation) could restrain this process. Even if a capital outflow regulation were 
in force, although useful, it would be insufficient for the same reason (i.e., the cur-
rency market features).
SoME LESSoNS FRoM ThE BRAzILIAN EXPERIENCE
Financial globalization has been featured by broader instability because both 
the higher frequency of currency crises and speculative attacks and the smaller 
domestic economic policy autonomy in this setting. Cyclical capital swings have 
strong effect on major macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rates, interest 
rates, domestic credit, and asset prices. In order to increase the room of maneuver 
of the exchange rate regime in emerging economies some measures to reduce the 
volatility of capital flows and the likelihood of speculative attacks on their curren-
cies are necessary. As we have seen in this paper, one possibility to enhance the 
management of exchange rates in emerging economies is the use of CAR that in-
cludes capital controls and/or prudential financial regulations.
Concerned with that amount and volatility of capital flows to emerging econ-
omies after the contagious of the 2008 crisis, IMF revised its official position to-
wards capital controls. By introducing the new term “capital flow management 
measures” (CFMs), the Fund gives more policy space to emerging economies sub-
ject to major capital inflow surges inasmuch it loosened the clear-cut hierarchy 
between instruments to manage capital flows which cover the whole range of mac-
roeconomic policies, macroprudential measures (MPM) and capital controls. yet, 
by labeling CFMs as a temporary instrument, the IMF still supports financial lib-
eralization in these economies as a final goal, keeps discriminating between CFMs 
and MPMs and set bounds to emerging economies’ policy space and their coun-
try-specific needs. 
Concerning the Brazilian recent experience, some lessons can be learned in 
dealing with capital flows and agents FX positions:
(i) In countries with open, depth and non-deliverable FX derivatives markets, 
a third type of regulation, the FX derivatives regulation, needs to be adopted along 
with CAR (capital controls and prudential financial regulation). While other coun-
tries faced only a problem of low efficacy of these two regulations due to the high 
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leverage degree of derivatives operations, in Brazil they turned out to be ineffective 
as these operations are liquidated in domestic currency. This means that they are 
likely to have an impact on the exchange rate with very low or even without any 
foreign capital inflows or outflows taking place. Besides that, most of these syn-
thetic operations are carried out in the Brazilian futures exchange – the derivatives 
organized market – by a wider set of agents beyond non-financial institutions, 
such as resident companies and non-resident investors. Thus, neither prudential 
financial regulation measures nor capital controls are sufficient to curb these op-
erations. 
(ii) In Brazil, CAR and FXDR have had two goals: (a) a macroprudential one, 
namely, limiting the financial fragility associated with capital flow reversals and 
FX derivatives exposures; (b) increasing the policy space to control the key macro-
economic prices (exchange rate and interest rate). There are important feedbacks 
between these two goals: as the Brazilian experience before the global financial 
crisis showed, currency appreciation stimulates speculative positions in FX deriva-
tives, threatening financial stability. Therefore, the capacity of maintaining the 
exchange rate in a competitive level (second goal) contributes to financial stability 
(first goal).
(iii) There are important feedbacks and complementarities among capital con-
trols, prudential financial regulation and FXDR, as much as between these mea-
sures and macroeconomic policy Capital controls need to be adopted to cover 
particular types of capital flows that are outside the scope of prudential regulation 
(for instance, foreign loans by non-financial companies). Moreover, FXDR may be 
needed to curb currency appreciation and/or financial risks in emerging economies 
with open and sophisticated FX derivatives markets, depending on the institu-
tional features of these markets (in Brazil, the non-deliverable feature of FX de-
rivatives and the predominance of futures traded in BM&F Bovespa). In turn, as 
Fritz and Prates (2014) highlighted, in the case of Korea the adoption of pruden-
tial financial regulation in the aftermath of the global financial crisis has been able 
to reach FX derivatives operations as they are carried on oTC markets where 
banks perform the role of counterparts in all transactions and are liquidated in US 
dollars. Thus prudential regulation has been able to cover all operations. Therefore, 
it is not possible to establish a hierarchy among instruments to manage capital 
flows and prevent their undesirable consequences, as supported by the current 
IMF approach.
(iv) A wider interest rate differential stimulates regulatory arbitrage, mainly in 
case of countries with sophisticated financial markets. In this context, CAR and 
FXDR have to be even more dynamic, flexible and adjustable, involving a steady 
“fine-tuning” to close loopholes found by private agents through spot and FX de-
rivatives transactions. only when Brazilian government adopted the three kinds of 
regulations simultaneously (capital controls, prudential financial regulation and 
FXDR), the policy effectiveness increased in terms of protecting the Brazilian cur-
rency from upward pressures. 
(v) CAR and FXDR need to be a permanent, yet flexible part of the policy 
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toolkit of emerging economies to increase their policy space and reduce the risks 
associated with liability structures towards capital flow reversals. Therefore, CAR 
and FXDR are integral part of the macroeconomic policy, as they can help eco-
nomic authorities to face and eventually solve some macroeconomic trade-offs, as 
it is the case of a situation in which the central bank wants to intervene in the FX 
market in order to affect nominal exchange rate, and at the same time would like 
to avoid the fiscal costs to sterilize such operations. 
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ANNEX
Table 1. Brazil: Capital account regulation (capital controls – CC and prudential  
financial regulation - PR) and FX derivatives regulation (FXDR) – 2009/2013
Data
Number 
and Kind 
Measure Agents
Oct./2009 10 CC 
The Ministry of Finance implemented a 2% financial tran-
saction tax (IOF) on non-resident equity and fixed income 
portfolio inflows. 
Non-resident 
investors
Oct./2010 
20 and  
3 CC
(i) IOF increased from 2 to 4 percent for fixed income 
portfolio investments and equity funds. 
(ii) IOF increased to 6 percent for fixed income 
investments
(iii) Limitations were also introduced on the ability of 
foreign investors to shift investment from equity to fixed 
income investment 
Non-resident 
investors
Oct./2010
10 and 20 
FXDR
(i) IOF on margin requirements on FX derivatives transac-
tions increased from 0.38 percent to 6 per cent
(ii) Loopholes for IOF on margin requirements were 
closed: foreign investors in the futures markets were 
no longer allowed to meet their margin requirements 
via locally borrowed securities or guarantees from local 
banks, which allowed them to avoid payment of the tax
Resident banks, 
institutional 
investors and 
companies and 
non-residents 
investors
Jan./2011 10 PR
Non-interest reserve requirement equivalent to 60 
percent of bank´s short dollar positions in the FX spot 
market that exceed US$ 3 billion or their capital base, 
whichever is smaller (to be implemented over 90 days)
Resident banks
Mar./2011 40 CC
Increased to 6 percent the IOF on new foreign loans 
(banking loans and securities issued abroad) with 
maturities of up a year. Companies and banks previously 
only paid a 5.38 percent IOF on loans up to 90 days. 
Resident banks 
and companies
April/2011 50 CC
(i) 6 percent IOF extended for the renewal of foreign 
loans with maturities of up a year 
(ii) 6 percent IOF extended for both new and renewed 
foreign loans with maturities of up to 2 years 
Resident banks 
and companies
July/2011 20 PR 
The Non-interest reserve requirement became 
mandatory for amounts over USD 1 billion or their capital 
base (whichever is smaller).
Resident banks
July/2011 30 FXDR 
Excessive long positions on BRL off all agents pay a 
financial tax of 1 percent. This tax can be increased up to 
25 per cent
Resident banks, 
institutional 
investors and 
companies and 
non-residents 
investors
Dec/2011 60 CC
IOF on equity and fixed income (linked with 
infrastructure projects) portfolio inflows reduced to 0%. 
Non-resident 
investors
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  37 (1), 2017 • pp. 108-128
129
Mar./2012 70 CC
(i) 6 percent IOF extended for both new and renewed 
foreign loans with maturities of up to 3 years
(ii)Export advanced payment transactions with maturities 
of more than a year prohibited
(iii) 6 percent IOF extended for both new and renewed 
foreign loans with maturities of up to 5 years 
Resident banks 
and companies
Mar./2012 40 FXDR
Exporters hedge operations (up to 1,2 times the exports 
of the previous year) exempted from the IOF.
Resident expor-
ters
June/2012 80 CC
6 percent IOF only for new and renewed foreign loans 
with maturities of up to 2 years (namely, the changes 
adopted in March were reversed)
Resident banks 
and companies
Dec./2012 90 CC
(i) 6 percent IOF for foreign loans with maturities of up 
to 1 year
(ii)Export advanced payment transactions maturity 
extended from 1 for 5 years.
Resident banks 
and companies
Jun./2013 100 CC
IOF on fixed income portfolio inflows reduced to 0 
percent.
Non-resident 
investors
Jun./2013 50 FXDR
IOF of 1 percent on excessive long net positions of FX 
derivatives of all agents reduced to 0 percent.
Resident banks, 
institutional 
investors and 
companies and 
non-residents 
investors
Jul./2013 30 PR
Non-interest reserve requirement on bank´s short dollar 
positions in the FX spot market reduced from 60 percent 
to 0 percent
Resident banks
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Central Bank of Brazil’s and Minister of Finance´s websites.
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